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1 Introduction
1 In formal labour markets, every employer is usually required to pay a statutory minimum wage (MW). In developing 
countries, however, much rural labour is outside the formal labour market, and does not benefit from MW provisions.
Of the 736 million people living in extreme poverty 
worldwide, about 80 per cent live in rural areas and 
depend on agriculture for survival. Many of these 
are smallholder farmers who receive a relatively 
small income for the crops they produce and 
market. Others are farm labourers who struggle to 
make ends meet due to low wages.1
A decent standard of living, one that covers basic 
needs and supports a dignified existence, is a 
human right (UN 1948) – one which is generally 
not guaranteed by farm income or wages. This is 
an issue because decent incomes for smallholder 
farmers (a ‘living income’) and workers (a ‘living 
wage’) are fundamental for the achievement of the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). They are directly relevant to SDG 1 (no 
poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 8 (decent 
work), and SDG 12 (sustainable consumption and 
production) (FAO 2019), and are also relevant to the 
achievement of other goals, such as SDG 4 (quality 
education).
This Rapid Review examines the state of the 
discussion among those who advocate for three 
interventions – living wage (LW), living income (LI), 
and child labour-free zones (CLFZ). Section 5 
reflects on some of the implications for children’s 
work in African agriculture. The Annexe identifies 
key actors promoting these interventions. The 
review is based primarily on literature published 
by organisations that promote these interventions 
to accurately reflect the perspectives of these 
organisations.
A key finding is that even though higher wages 
are needed for workers to improve their earnings 
and livelihoods, they are just one of many factors 
required to enable workers to lead decent lives. 
Also, a LW has no legal standing and can only 
address in-work poverty: it does not directly 
address problems associated with unemployment 
or informal employment. Higher wages can raise 
the living standards of some workers, but will 
have a limited effect because most rural workers 
are employed informally and only work seasonally 
(Bartik 2004). In the context of smallholder farming, 
where the farmers themselves rarely earn a 
decent income, many will find it challenging if not 
impossible to pay their workers a LW (ACCA 2017).
To overcome some of these challenges, a greater 
share of economic value of agricultural commodities 
must find its way to farmers. Currently, many 
poor farmers cannot afford to invest in more 
efficient farming methods to improve their income. 
Another finding is that interventions that are 
purely production-focused ignore the need for an 
enabling environment and the role of other value 
chain actors in shaping farmers’ income prospects. 
For example, enhanced productivity may lead to 
depressed prices. Further, increasing prices alone 
is not enough to improve farmers’ income, or to 
close the gap between their actual incomes and the 
LI. Even with higher crop prices, the risks, limited 
power, and structural barriers faced by farmers in 
many value chains may undermine any single effort 
to provide enough sustainability to improve farmers’ 
income. Also, because many farmers’ incomes are 
derived from multiple avenues (including non-farm 
sources), it is challenging to determine whether a 
farmer earns a LI.
An additional finding is that, according to LW and 
LI champions, higher incomes for adults could 
have significant effects in reducing overall levels 
of household poverty and thus lower the pressure 
on children to work. However, some studies show 
that, in specific situations, LW initiatives may have 
negative impacts on children’s and adults’ work. 
There is a risk that being required to pay higher 
wages to adults could encourage some employers 
to substitute adults for children who can be paid 
at lower wage rates. Furthermore, in some African 
contexts, where children’s work may be related to 
factors other than low household income levels 
such as cultural norms, new skills acquisition, or 
personal choice, a LW or LI may not necessarily 
affect the prevalence of their work. 
An underlying assumption of LW and LI advocates 
is that children work primarily because of poverty 
(the ‘poverty argument’). However, there is another 
argument put forward by the Stop Child Labour 
(SCL) coalition, which promotes the CLFZ model. 
SCL’s ‘education argument’ suggests that child 
labour is not only an effect of poverty but one of its 
key causes as well, and that the solution to child 
labour is to assure that all children are in full-time 
education. In addition to this difference in dynamic 
of causality between poverty and children’s work, 
the LW and LI discussion is usually centred around 
a specific sector, whilst CLFZ are, by definition, 
area based. 
Despite these differences, the two approaches 
share a belief that when child labour is banned in an 
area, it can create additional work opportunities for 
adults and enable unconstrained decision-making 
in relation to education (Anker 2000; Doran 2013; 
SCL 2016, 2017a). However, as mentioned above, 
in some contexts, increased wages for adults 
encourage employers to hire children at lower 
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rates. It is important to note that poverty is a large 
causal factor in child labour, yet once child labour 
is rooted, it entrenches poverty further and across 
generations. A unidirectional causal argument is 
therefore simplistic as the dynamic between child 
labour and poverty is bidirectional. Further, in 
contexts where the returns to education are poor, 
children’s choice between education and work may 
not be straightforward.
2 Living wage
A living wage generally refers to the wage 
necessary for survival based on the real cost of 
living (May 1982; Wills and Linneker 2014). More 
recently, however, there have been attempts to 
expand the definition beyond mere survival, such 
as including the capacity to support a family, 
maintain self-respect, and participate in civic life 
(Brenner et al. 2002; Fabo and Belli 2017; Glickman 
1999). Even though historically the terms LW and 
minimum wage (MW) were used interchangeably, 
after the Second World War their meanings started 
to diverge (Box 1). This differentiation occurred as 
workers and governments in different countries 
failed (for ideological or other reasons) to maintain 
the buying power of the MW (Schenk 2001). In 
periods of inflation, low‑wage workers suffered the 
most as the buying power of the MW fell below 
the poverty line (Fabo and Belli 2017; Piketty and 
Goldhammer 2014; Pollin 2007). This phenomenon 
prompted renewed interest in a LW (ILO 2009). 
In line with moral arguments based on social justice, 
the LW was recognised as a basic human right by 
the International Labour Organization (ILO) formed 
in 1919 and in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights adopted in 1948 (Parker et al. 2016). The 
economic argument states that a LW supports the 
sustainability and capability of the labour force, and 
the political claim is that a LW reduces the risk of 
social tension and crime (ibid.). 
Efforts to promote a LW have been traditionally 
common in the English‑speaking world. The first 
modern LW campaign started in Baltimore, USA, 
in 1994, which followed a proposal from a civil 
society coalition and successfully resulted in local 
legislation. This campaign generated a range of 
Box 1. Minimum wage and living wage: definitions and differences
The ILO (2020) defines MW as ‘the minimum amount of remuneration that an employer 
is required to pay wage earners for the work performed during a given period, which 
cannot be reduced by collective agreement or an individual contract’.
The Global Living Wage Coalition (2020b) defines LW as 
the remuneration received for a standard workweek by a worker in a particular place 
sufficient to afford a decent standard of living for the worker and her or his family. 
Elements of a decent standard of living include food, water, housing, education, 
health care, transportation, clothing, and other essential needs including provision for 
unexpected events.
The main differences between a MW and a LW are: 
• The MW is agreed through negotiations between government, industry, and trade 
unions, whereas the LW is usually calculated by independent non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs);
• The MW is a legally enforceable minimum level of pay, whilst the LW is a benchmark 
with no legal grounding; and 
• The MW is about eliminating unduly low pay, whilst the LW is about ensuring 
workers can afford a decent life and is commonly higher than the MW.
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successors across the USA, as well as in the UK, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Fabo and 
Belli 2017; Levi, Olson and Steinman 2002; Luce 
2004). Interestingly, there has not been much 
spillover into continental Europe. There, instead of 
a market-driven approach to welfare and labour 
market policy, the social contract is stronger and 
includes powerful trade unions and relatively high 
MW rates. In this context, the LW concept has 
been less relevant, thus trade unions and politicians 
have often focused their campaigns on reducing 
working hours rather than increasing rates of 
pay. The concept did gain some prominence in 
low-income countries within the debate about 
fair incomes. Here, where there is limited formal-
sector employment and weaker trade unions, a 
very low and poorly enforced MW, and weak or 
non-existent state systems of social security, the 
LW is still more about survival and income security 
(Parker et al. 2016). In rural areas, hired workers in 
agriculture are paid a low wage and even though 
they may receive benefits such as housing, they 
often experience little job security, poor living 
and working conditions, and exploitation by their 
employers (Fairtrade 2019b). In many households 
where workers receive wages that are insufficient 
to support their family, their children work and 
become an additional source of income. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states 
that ‘everyone has the right to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself 
and of his family, including food, clothing, housing 
and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other 
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control’ (UN 1948). A LW is therefore defined, by 
most advocates, as the amount a worker is paid for 
his labour, which should be enough for them and 
their family to afford this decent standard of living. 
This means earning enough to cover all of life’s 
basic necessities, from housing to food, enabling 
participation in society, with a little extra to cover 
unexpected events. The value of a LW varies greatly 
depending on the country and the region, because 
the cost of food, housing, and other necessities 
differ from place to place (Rainforest Alliance 2019). 
2.1 Estimation of a living wage
Although there is no globally accepted method 
to calculate a LW, the Anker Methodology is 
implemented by the Global Living Wage Coalition 
(GLWC) and by many other organisations (Figure 1). 
This methodology is used for benchmarking and it 
estimates the actual expenses of workers’ families 
based on a ‘basket’ of items: nutritious food, decent 
housing, clothing, and other essential needs. A 
small amount is added for emergencies to reach 
the estimated household expense. This expense is 
then divided by the average number of full-time-
equivalent workers in a typical household in the 
area, to arrive at the net LW. Any deductions or 
taxes are factored into the calculations in order to 
determine the necessary gross wage (Anker 2011; 
Fairtrade 2020a).
This methodology involves consultation with local 
stakeholders, including trade unions and employer 
organisations. Workers’ homes and local markets 
are visited to identify housing and food costs. 
Workers provide information on their lifestyles 
and living conditions, while employers supply 
information on benefits in‑kind, bonuses, and any 
other types of compensation. Stakeholders have the 
chance to provide feedback and suggestions about 
the preliminary estimates before the benchmark 
figure is finalised. The goal is to obtain a credible, 
legitimate LW estimate, regardless of whether 
or not local employers feel it is affordable (Anker 
2011; Fairtrade 2020a). 
2.2 Debates on a living wage
Some economic research has challenged the idea 
of a LW, suggesting it is not an efficient way of 
addressing the problem of the working poor. One 
suggestion is that fiscal policy is a more direct 
and efficient way of helping the working poor. 
For example, reducing payroll taxes or increasing 
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) would allow 
workers to take home more earned income.  
Figure 1. Estimation of a living wage 
benchmark
• Nutritious low-cost diet
• Basic acceptable housing
• Clothing and footwear
• Others (for a decent life)
• Household size to 
support (4 most common)
• Number of full-time 
workers in the household 
(1 or 2)
• Sustainability margin 
(discretionary 
expenditures, savings, 
emergencies)
Cost of 
basic 
quality 
life per 
person
LW for 
worker
Source: Adapted from Anker (2011).
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This is essentially a neoliberal perspective, in which 
individuals need to be incentivised and businesses 
need to be freed to ensure that everyone is 
earning what they are worth. This further 
reflects a neoclassical economic understanding 
of self-interested economic rationality, both of 
individuals and firms. Thus, reducing payroll taxes 
is viewed as a ‘win-win’ scenario in that it allows 
workers to earn more from more work, and firms 
to keep more by not having to pay artificially high 
wages (Karjanen 2010). In this view, within a 
supposedly natural labour market, better wages will 
not come through imposed wage levels, but rather 
through higher skills and improved productivity 
(Business New Zealand 2005). If workers want 
better wages, it is deemed as their responsibility to 
make themselves more competitive and valuable. 
Relying on market signals to make wage decisions 
is also seen as fair to workers in that it respects the 
principle of equity view, where reward should be 
proportionate to contribution. 
Typically, any time the government attempts 
to legislate what businesses must pay their 
employees, it is fiercely contested by the business 
community through Chambers of Commerce, 
industry associations, and the like (Brooks 2007; 
Luce 2005). The main arguments presented by 
those opposing a LW are that a LW mandate will 
cause employers to hire fewer workers and will 
disincentivise companies from operating in certain 
areas (Levin‑Waldman 2005; Reynolds and Kern 
2003). Opponents also argue that the cost of local 
services will increase, costing taxpayers additional 
money (Brooks 2007). These arguments are 
embedded in an imaginary of a LW as a natural 
disaster, disrespectful of employers’ rights, and 
the significant risks that they take. In this view, a 
LW is far removed from the natural functioning of 
a free market economy, and labour markets where 
the laws of supply and demand should set wages 
(Karjanen 2010). The claim that firms’ primary duty 
is to assure their own competitiveness implies that 
it is not the responsibility of businesses to address 
any negative social consequences associated with 
low pay. It is also not businesses’ responsibility to 
pay workers a LW if the market signals that they do 
not deserve it (Skilling 2019). 
However, most empirical research suggests that 
LW ordinances have not significantly increased the 
budgets or costs of local contracts and that few 
jobs have been lost as a result of their introduction 
(Brooks 2007; Thompson and Chapman 2006). 
Arguments in favour of a LW hold that while 
market signals have a valid role in informing wage 
decisions, such decisions should also take into 
account other important outcomes including long-
term organisational performance, and the inherent 
dignity of the human worker (Skilling 2019). The 
notion of a LW carries moral, economic, and political 
weight, and indeed is seen by bodies such as the 
ILO as akin to a basic human right (Anker 2011; 
ILO 2013; Parker et al. 2016). LW campaigns stress 
its role in poverty reduction. Here the underlying 
assumption is that an important barrier to reducing 
poverty is inadequate wages at entry-level jobs. 
The moral perspective of LW campaigners is that 
it is unjust for workers to only be able to find jobs 
that pay poverty‑level wages. Many LW activists 
view wages as being determined by employers. 
From this perspective, it is immoral for an employer 
who has the ability to pay LW to refuse to do so 
(Bartik 2004). The political argument focuses on the 
relevance of a wage that enables workers to afford 
a decent life and that minimises their need for 
disruptive behaviours (Parker et al. 2016). 
By definition, a LW can only tackle in‑work poverty 
and employers are not obliged to implement it. 
A LW is not a mechanism for directly addressing 
poverty among those who are out of work or 
working in the informal economy, although these 
people should be considered when estimating the 
impact that a LW may have on employment levels 
(ACCA 2017). Higher wages play a large role in 
increasing the living standards of lower-middle 
class and working class individuals but have a 
limited effect on the poor because most of the poor 
do not have steady, full-time work (Bartik 2004). 
Additionally, in the case of small-scale farming 
where the farmers themselves rarely earn a decent 
income they will find it challenging if not impossible 
to provide their farmworkers with a LW. Also, a LW 
is only one of many requirements required to help 
workers lead decent lives: regardless of wage level, 
uncertain working hours and ‘zero hours contracts’ 
can also create financial and emotional stress 
(ACCA 2017).
It is difficult to agree on what constitutes a LW, 
because it is relative to a particular society, place, 
and time. The absence of an agreed definition and 
methodology for determining a LW is an obstacle to 
its implementation and evaluation, and means that 
a LW is more accepted in theory than in practice 
(Anker 2011; Parker et al. 2016). Furthermore, in 
rural areas, assessing the actual wage farmworkers 
receive has proven particularly challenging. Unlike 
the better-documented formal sector pay systems, 
an examination of farm audits suggests that many 
lack key documentation pertaining to workers’ 
wages. In many cases, farms are unable to provide 
corroborating materials such as work contracts, 
pay stubs, payroll records, hours-of-work records, 
or documentation of benefits in‑kind. Inconsistent 
pay structures, temporary work arrangements, 
and sharecropping arrangements also hinder a 
comparison of wages from farm to farm, or from 
region to region. This makes it difficult to prioritise 
where workers would benefit most from remedial 
action (FLA 2017).
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3 Living income
In addition to wage workers, agricultural supply 
chains include farmers working on their own land 
or as tenants, who earn an income from selling their 
produce. These individuals face different challenges 
to agricultural workers. When farmers are trapped 
in poverty, they usually cannot afford to invest in 
more efficient or productive farming methods to 
improve their income. They may not be able to 
pay their workers a decent wage, or they may 
resort to using children for cheap labour (Fairtrade 
2019b). In conventional trade, smallholder farmers 
have no control over market prices and little if any 
negotiating power. Consequently, they are at the 
mercy of volatile markets and the goodwill of their 
market partners. In times of oversupply prices can 
fall below the cost of production, which particularly 
impacts smallholder farmers as they have limited 
reserves. Prolonged periods of low prices, like those 
seen recently in the cocoa and coffee sectors, can 
have disastrous effects on both farmer livelihoods 
and the long-term sustainability of supply (ibid.).
Achieving a decent income for farmers might 
support and strengthen livelihoods and supply 
sustainability. A LI is defined as sufficient income to 
afford a decent standard of living for all household 
members, including a nutritious diet, clean water, 
decent housing, education, health care and other 
essential needs, plus some extra for emergencies 
and savings, after farm costs are covered (Fairtrade 
2019a; The Living Income Community of Practice 
2019). In an industrial economy, ‘improving 
incomes’ might be used interchangeably with 
‘increasing incomes’. For smallholder farmers, this 
is not necessarily the case. The reliability of their 
income may be the most important consideration, 
with their first priority being to cover essential 
family expenditure (Rainforest Alliance 2019). 
Investments that could, in principle, increase 
future income may be ignored if they involve 
increased risks and upfront costs. Familiar but 
inefficient techniques and inputs may be preferred 
instead. Reliability requires managing the risks of 
catastrophic crop failure and market-related risks 
such as price collapse. It also means ensuring that 
the family income covers expenditure throughout 
the year, when the timing of major expenses (such 
as farming inputs, or the costs of health care or 
education) are unlikely to coincide with the harvest. 
This need for income-smoothing during the year is 
a major motivation for the diversification of income 
sources by farming families (Sustainable Food Lab 
and Business Fights Poverty 2017).
3.1 Estimation of a living income
A farmer’s income is what remains after operational 
costs associated with land and equipment, wages 
for hired workers, and the cost of other inputs 
like seeds and fertilisers have been deducted 
from the total revenue. A LI can be estimated in a 
similar way to a LW, as the net annual household 
income required for a decent standard of living 
for all members of that household. It is important 
to remember that household income of a farming 
family will in most cases include sources of income 
additional to those from the farm (Rainforest 
Alliance 2019; Smith and Sarpong 2018). 
Most stakeholders use an adapted version of the 
Anker Methodology to calculate the LI (Figure 2). 
The objective is to generate ‘cost of living’ estimates 
and compare them to the LI benchmarks (Figure 3). 
It has been observed, however, that this may 
not always be practical due to time and financial 
constraints, and in such cases a complementary 
stop-gap approach may be required (Grillo 2018; 
Rainforest Alliance 2019). 
Basic quality of life 
per person
Costs of: nutritious low-cost 
diet, basic acceptable housing, 
other essential expenses, 
emergency margin
Living income
x Family 
size
Figure 2. Estimation of a living income 
benchmark
Source: Adapted from ISEAL Alliance , GIZ and 
Sustainable Food Lab (2015).
10 ACHA Rapid Review 1
3.2 Debates on a living income
Ultimately, improving incomes is a means of 
enhancing families’ quality of life. Increasing 
the prices paid to smallholders for their crops 
may lead to increased crop production, but are, 
by themselves, insufficient to lift farmers out of 
poverty. If there are no other policies in place to 
mitigate the negative effects of the production 
increase resulting from a price increase, short-term 
benefits for farmers’ incomes may be accompanied 
by negative long-term effects from further 
downward pressure on prices. In fact, price 
increases are more likely to be sustainable when 
applied across the board by all major buyers within 
a sector or by a public institution managing the 
crop, rather than by a select few. Also, sustainability 
is more likely if market conditions are created which 
result in increased prices. Such conditions might 
include supporting farmers to improve quality 
standards or offering more value-added services 
(Sustainable Food Lab and Business Fights Poverty 
2017). As income and life quality are dependent 
on many different factors, it is difficult to assess 
whether the average farmer earns enough for a 
decent life. Even though it is an area where further 
research is needed (Eosta 2018), there is a debate 
about the respective roles of different actors in the 
agricultural system. Arguments address farmers’ 
abilities and limits to improve their own incomes, 
and stakeholders’ responsibilities to help them.
3.2.1 Farmers’ limits for a living income
Increasing prices alone is not enough to reach the 
farmers most in need, or to close the gap between 
current income and LI. The risks (inputs, price, 
climate, and land), limited power (market access, 
bargaining power, and upgrading/diversification), 
and structural barriers (value chain, commodity 
sector, and public policy) that farmers face are 
key factors to account for when seeking to 
improve farmers’ income (Oxfam 2018). Exposure 
to risks and volatility is inherent in all market 
systems. In the agricultural system, smallholder 
farmers are particularly exposed to them. Risks 
disproportionately affect farmers’ ability and 
willingness to invest in their farms, and thus lower 
their income prospects. Barriers to raising farmers’ 
incomes are rooted in the skewed distribution of 
power between farmers and other value chain 
actors. For farmers to earn a LI, they must be able 
to access, compete in, and flourish in a balanced 
and fair market environment. Implementing 
technical interventions at the farm level alone is 
insufficient to address these challenges. Tackling 
the underlying imbalances in risk and market power 
requires a change in the ‘rules of the game’ that 
structure and govern the agricultural system. This 
includes addressing the operation of value chains, 
commodity sectors, and public policy (ibid.). 
For agricultural commodities, often governments, 
sector organisations, or commodity exchanges will 
influence the prices farmers receive. Smallholder 
farmers have little leverage, not only because of 
their size, but also because they cannot risk their 
crops rotting while they shop for a price that meets 
their needs. Even when a product is not perishable, 
they often lack storage facilities, and must sell their 
produce as soon as possible. If a farmer is unable 
to earn a LI, it is less likely that his/her farmworkers 
will earn a LW. Addressing this vicious cycle would 
require redistributing a greater share of value in the 
supply chain to farmers (FLA 2017). 
3.2.2 Stakeholders’ responsibilities for a 
living income
Even in a globalised food system, farmers’ 
behaviours and choices are as much tied to local 
farming conditions as to market signals transmitted 
through global value chains. An ambition for a LI 
shifts the end goal from incrementally raising the 
incomes of individual groups of farmers to more 
sustained progress for all farmers, regardless 
of their differences. The claim is that a LI can 
thus serve as a catalyst for new, farmer-centred 
conversations about how best to support farmers 
living in poverty and addressing associated issues 
like food security, nutrition, health, and gender 
equity. Approaches that are purely production-
Figure 3. The living income gap 
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Potential 
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Source: Adapted from The Living Income Community of Practice (2019).
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focused tend to ignore the need for an enabling 
environment and the role and influence of other 
value chain actors in shaping farmers’ income 
prospects. There are many different ways that 
farmers’ incomes can be improved (Oxfam 2018). 
Some campaigning organisations highlight the 
problems that arise when smallholder farmers 
receive only a small fraction of the price that their 
crops fetch in international markets (e.g. unreliable 
source of supply, inequality, poverty, etc.). They 
argue that smallholder farmers have a right to a 
greater share of the value and global companies 
must accept a reduction in profitability in order to 
increase farm-gate prices (Sustainable Food Lab 
and Business Fights Poverty 2017). In this view, in 
the short term, companies have the responsibility 
to ensure a higher farm-gate price (implementing 
floor prices or flexible premiums). In the medium 
to long term, they have the responsibility to ensure 
holistic sustainability interventions, incorporating 
income diversification strategies and access to 
finance in their sustainability programmes (VOICE 
Network 2017).
Stakeholders can play different roles in support 
of achieving LI for smallholder farmers (see 
Annexe A1). Whilst cooperatives unite farmers in 
order to advance their interests by improving their 
market access, training, and support (Fairtrade 
2018), trade unions also run campaigns, lobby 
politicians, and represent the interests of workers 
more broadly (Parker et al. 2016). Employers’ 
reputations can impact on customers’ preferences 
and purchasing decisions, which may ultimately 
affect companies’ revenues and future standards. 
Finally, governments have a number of ways to 
support the improvement of farmers’ incomes 
including through effective policy, infrastructure 
and service provision, and ensuring market access 
(Sustainable Food Lab and Business Fights Poverty 
2017; VOICE Network 2017).
4 The child labour-free zones model
Low wages and incomes are general indicators of 
poverty. Poverty is often cited as one of the main 
drivers of child labour in Africa and elsewhere 
(SCL 2017b); however, this notion has been 
challenged. There is an ongoing debate about the 
link between child labour and poverty, and the 
direction of causality (Basu and Millard 2015). 
Some opposed to the ‘poverty argument’ suggest 
that economic factors induce child labour. To 
these opponents, child labour is more a result of 
state failure, including limited access to a good 
quality education; a lack of decent work for adults; 
and harmful cultural values and practices such 
as early marriages (SCL 2017b). In this view, the 
‘poverty argument’ is countered with the ‘education 
argument’, which conceives a bidirectional causal 
relationship and suggests that child labour is not 
only an effect of poverty but one of its key causes 
as well. The education argument suggests that 
investment in good quality education has spin-off 
effects in reducing poverty by increasing access 
to higher value employment and consequently 
to better life opportunities. In this view, any 
educational support to working children would be 
an implicit acceptance of child labour (Basu and 
Millard 2015). It rejects the need to provide an 
education to working children outside the working 
hours, considers universal education and the 
eradication of child labour as inseparable, and sees 
formal schooling as the only means to universalise 
education and simultaneously eliminate child labour 
(MVF, n.d.).
The Mamidipudi Venkatarangaiya Foundation, or 
MV Foundation (MVF), an Indian non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), applied the education 
argument in 1991 when it released 30 children 
from bonded labour in Ranga Reddy district in 
central India (SCL 2017d), in order to get them 
back to school. MVF’s goal is to eradicate child 
labour by ensuring that all children attend full-time 
regular school, either government-run or private. 
Although it initially supported non-formal education 
and open school initiatives, it no longer does so, 
arguing that such initiatives enable child labour by 
implicitly allowing children to engage in full-time 
work during school hours. MVF continues to work 
towards eradicating child labour in different areas in 
India. European, Asian, Latin American, and African 
organisations are now replicating the initiative. 
MVF and its partners argue that eliminating child 
labour in all its forms can be achieved by adopting 
an area-based approach, which focuses on the 
rights of all children in a specific geographical area 
(otherwise known as the integrated area-based 
approach or IABA). Their initiative is rooted in a 
rights-based approach in which every child (rights 
holder) and every risk of violation of child rights are 
seen as being of similar strength (Basu and Millard 
2015; SCL 2017b). 
The approach to reducing, and eventually 
eliminating child labour using IABA is known as 
the child labour free zones (CLFZ) model. The 
idea of CLFZ stems from a belief in the paramount 
importance of children’s right to education and 
12 ACHA Rapid Review 1
assumes that all kinds of children’s work are 
harmful and should be eradicated, and that 
all children should be at school instead. Here, 
children’s work and education are incompatible 
(SCL 2017c). This means that no distinction is 
being made between different forms of child labour 
(such as the worst forms of child labour, or children 
doing invisible work such as domestic work or 
work on the family farm) and the focus is on all 
children in that area that are not attending school. 
It is suggested that people living in CLFZ believe 
that child labour (and low school attendance) is not 
a result of poverty, but a result of child-unfriendly 
traditions, violations of workers’ rights, and poor 
education systems (Hivos 2015). 
The key stakeholder advocating for CLFZ is Stop 
Child Labour (SCL), a coalition founded in 2003. 
SCL is coordinated by the NGO Hivos and consists 
of Netherlands-based organisations2 that fund it 
in addition to the Dutch government. Local partner 
organisations are based in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. CLFZ are defined by SCL as ‘geographical 
areas, such as a village, plantation area, small 
island, urban neighbourhood, or cluster of 
communities, where all children are systematically 
being taken away from labour and (re)integrated 
into formal, full-time schools’ (Hivos 2015: 6). SCL 
strongly believes in a holistic approach towards the 
prevention and remediation of child labour. ‘Child 
labour’, as defined by SCL, is ‘work performed 
by a child that is likely to interfere with his or her 
right to education, or to be harmful to his or her 
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social 
development. All work done by children under the 
age of 15, and dangerous work done by children 
under the age of 18, is illegal’ (ibid.: 9). 
Hivos (2015: 15) states that CLFZ are based on the 
following beliefs, which are said not to be dogmatic, 
but rather guidelines:
• All children must attend day schools full-time.
• Any child who is not in school is a child labourer.
• All labour is hazardous and harms the growth 
and development of the child.
• All forms of child labour can be eliminated.
• Any justification that perpetuates the existence 
of child labour must be condemned.
• Not poverty, but harmful social norms, the 
violation of workers’ rights, and poor education 
policies are the main causes of child labour.
2 The SCL coalition consists of and is funded by the Algemene Onderwijsbond (AOb), FNV Mondiaal, Hivos, the India 
Committee of the Netherlands (ICN), ICCO Cooperation and Kerk in Actie, Stichting Kinderpostzegels Nederland.
• Parents want a better future for their children 
and are willing to and capable of making the 
necessary choices or sacrifices to ensure that 
their child does not go to work but to school 
instead.
Even though CLFZ have universal characteristics, 
different areas may need different approaches 
(e.g. rural vs urban). A CLFZ approach entails a 
sustained engagement with the community to 
change attitudes toward norms around child labour 
and to empower the community to eliminate it (ILO 
2011). These communities would then set the norm 
that ‘no child should work; every child must be in 
school’ (Hivos 2015: 7). CLFZ involve all people 
who live, work, and attend school within a specific 
area, including teachers, parents, children, unions, 
community groups, local authorities, religious 
leaders, and employers. When selecting an area, 
it is important to have good connections in the 
community: they must know the implementing 
organisation and their own community well. 
Also, the area should be relatively open to new 
initiatives (ibid.). The selected area needs to be 
an administrative unit recognised by the state 
with authorities that can implement government 
policies on education and economic development. 
Local authorities supervising these units – whether 
villages, communes, or wards – are crucial partners 
both in the creation of CLFZ, and in keeping them 
child labour‑free. They are influential and have links 
to other authorities at regional and national levels, 
which means they can have some influence on 
policy. Gatekeepers and committees are also key 
enablers, generating awareness and acceptance 
of the concept. The idea is that the initiative 
starts in one specific area before spilling over into 
neighbouring areas (ibid.). In the past five years, 
63,000 children in Africa and Latin America have 
been withdrawn from child labour through SCL. 
This covered 112 communities in 14 countries 
through the support of more than 25 local partners 
(NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs), 
and trade unions) (Figure 4) (Hoeksema 2018).
Once the zone has been selected, activities to 
secure the rights of all children are initiated within 
existing community groups in cooperation with local 
authorities (SCL 2017b). Children who have never 
been to school or who had dropped out of school 
are enrolled and provided with necessary materials. 
Bridge schools are established for older children, 
and technical support is given to schools. The 
programme trains young advocates and supports 
children’s initiatives and monitoring committees. 
It also involves discussions with the community 
to revise values, cultural norms, and child-rearing 
practices (Wandega 2014). According to SCL, 
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social change within families and communities on 
issues such as child abuse, early marriage, and 
teenage pregnancy is more likely when education 
is prioritised. Apart from the direct impact on 
out-of-school and working children, positive 
effects for adults and legally working youth are 
also likely (SCL 2016). Adults learn how to make 
ends meet without the income generated by their 
children; for instance, by participating in savings 
and loan groups and developing additional or 
complementary income-generating activities (SCL 
2017b). In some cases, adults’ working conditions 
and incomes have been improved through lobbying 
companies, linking them to social services schemes 
or vocational training (SCL 2016).
It is important to note that the CLFZ model 
is promoted by SCL, a coalition that receives 
substantial financial support from private and 
public-funded organisations from high-income 
countries in addition to the support from multilateral 
organisations (Bourdillon, Crivello and Pankhurst 
2015). In fact, CLFZ appear as top-down initiatives, 
which can overlook key interests of the poor. 
Limited understanding of the perspectives of the 
people being helped results in the imposition of 
questionable models. The CLFZ approach ignores 
the fact that the goal of eliminating child labour 
diverges from the goal of protecting children from 
harmful work. This policy consists of eliminating 
both harmful and non-harmful work (ibid.). In these 
contexts, policies that criminalise ‘acceptable’ 
aspects of children’s work may not be in children’s 
best interests, while those that protect children 
from hazards or exploitation may have more 
positive effects. 
Community monitoring of children’s work, 
sometimes proposed as an alternative when 
state capacity is limited, relies on strong social 
disapproval of children working, high social 
acceptance of education, and willingness to report 
other community members. In some contexts, none 
of these may be reasonable assumptions. Another 
important assumption is that as a consequence of 
monitoring, children provided with education as 
an alternative to work are, and will be, better off. 
In fact, this assumption relies on CLFZ equating 
to poverty-free zones, with adequate safety nets 
to meet the needs of families in crisis. However, 
investment in quality education might not lead 
to poverty reduction if higher value employment 
is not available locally. Also, children’s work can 
frequently make an important contribution to 
household wellbeing (Bourdillon et al. 2015), 
and can be a source of pride and empowerment 
for the child, family, and community. For families 
with subsistence incomes who cannot rely on a 
social safety net, an effectively enforced ban on 
children’s work could be devastating. These families 
must either struggle or earn income in ways that 
circumvent the ban. Therefore, in some cases, 
withdrawn child labourers may move from the 
CLFZ to areas where they can more easily work. 
Or, this often means that adults and children resort 
to underground jobs such as sex work. In either 
case, an important part of the burden falls on the 
shoulders of the children. 
Figure 4. CLFZ project organisation
Hivos
Coordinating, fund managing, 
capacity-building, linking, learning, and 
technical advice on programme
Stakeholders
Local government, companies, 
communities, traditional leaders, teachers, 
parents, children
Local partners: NGOs and trade unions
Implementing CLFZ
Dutch coalition members
Fund managing, capacity-building, linking, 
learning, technical advice on project
Source: Adapted from Hivos (2016), Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported Licence.
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Bourdillon et al. (2015) suggest that many of 
those advocating for CLFZ are motivated more 
by emotion than information about the lives 
of working children. They suggest that such 
programmes can undoubtedly benefit deprived 
children educationally; but it is not self-evident 
that they will be able to fulfil their wider aims. The 
3 Parallel to the CLFZ model, an emerging approach launched in 1996 and led by UNICEF in more than 40 countries is 
the Child-Friendly Cities Initiative (CFCI). A child-friendly city is any system of local governance committed to improving 
the lives of children within their jurisdiction by realising their rights as articulated in the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child. In practice, a child-friendly city is where the voices, needs, priorities, and rights of children are an integral part 
of public policies, programmes, and decisions (UNICEF 2020). Here, children (a) are protected from exploitation, violence, 
and abuse; (b) have a good start in life and grow up healthy and cared for; (c) have access to quality social services; (d) 
experience quality, inclusive, and participatory education and skills development; (e) express their opinions and influence 
decisions that affect them; (f) participate in family, cultural, city/community, and social life; (g) live in a safe, secure, and 
clean environment with access to green spaces; (h) meet friends and have places to play and enjoy themselves; and (i) 
have a fair chance in life regardless of their ethnic origin, religion, income, gender, or ability (ibid.).
4 Furthermore, action against children’s work at present might improve their own future earnings as adults. Research 
shows that in some contexts, policies which delay school dropout, even if the child works, would appear to be effective at 
improving children’s future income as adults (Ilahi, Orazem and Sedlacek 2001).
CLFZ approach leaves little room for children’s 
responsibilities to their families and for children’s 
participation in decisions that affect them (ibid.). 
In their view, the CLFZ discourse is rooted in an 
imaginary where all children in every situation are 
equally vulnerable and in need of protection, which 
does not reflect the reality of African rural areas.3 
5 Implications for children’s work
LW and LI are promoted as means to improve 
livelihoods and promote more sustainable 
agricultural systems. Higher standards may be 
achieved through focusing on working conditions, 
such as addressing potential child labour in the 
value chains. For many stakeholders, children’s 
work is always viewed as negative. In order to 
prevent children from working and enable them 
to focus on their education, the assumption is 
that adult income must increase, and in turn, this 
will reduce children’s pressure to work and thus 
positively impact their education.
There is indeed some research that investigates 
the connection between income variations and 
child labour; however, not much of it explores the 
specific links between LW or LI and children’s work. 
Some of this research suggests that child labour 
can displace adult labour and, as a consequence, 
it may reduce adult wage rates and increase 
adult unemployment rates – that is, child labour 
negatively affects working conditions for adult 
workers (Doran 2013; FNV 2010; Venkateswarlu 
and Ramakrishna 2010). In this view, this is 
particularly pertinent for less educated and less 
skilled adult wage earners in rural areas due to the 
high prevalence of unskilled agrarian child labour 
(Anker 2000). 
Furthermore, in some cases, children work because 
their family is unable to meet their basic needs 
(Basu and Van 1998), but few working children 
earn a MW. Employers may prefer the cheaper 
option of employing children who are in no position 
to organise themselves and negotiate for better 
wages and working conditions. Children’s work 
can, as a result, undermine the bargaining power 
of adult workers in getting better wages and 
conditions of employment (FNV 2010; Nhenga-
Chakarisa 2013). This is a scenario that ultimately 
results in a cycle of low household income, thereby 
keeping families in poverty. 
In order to break this cycle, in the medium term, 
labour market segmentation can be reduced 
and the weakest protected through modern 
labour institutions (e.g. trade unions, MW, and 
job security laws). In the meantime, in contexts 
where parents alone are not able to earn enough 
to adequately provide for their families, a holistic 
approach is essential to tackle children’s harmful 
work. Interventions are needed to compensate 
for the lost income of children and their additional 
needs – subsidised food, cash transfers, and 
adequate health and education facilities are just 
some examples of more holistic social provision. 
Governments can advocate for the provision of 
adequate remuneration for workers and bargain for 
better prices for agricultural products internationally 
so that households do not need to depend on 
children’s work. In the view of those who champion 
LI and LW, enforcing them could have significant 
positive effects in reducing overall levels of poverty 
and thus the need for children to work.4 
However, a LW and a LI may have effects beyond 
simply relieving household poverty. Children 
may work for reasons other than economic, and 
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employers may hire children for many reasons 
besides lower wages. Traditionally, there has been 
widespread acceptance of children’s work within 
families, communities, and employers. Today, 
this acceptance may embody an incentive for 
children to work. It seems that frequently none of 
the concerned parties – employers, communities, 
parents, or children – see anything wrong with this 
and thus the practice of children’s work continues. 
The importance of cultural norms and the strong 
resistance to change must not be underestimated 
(Chakrabarty 2007; Lederer, Bequele and Boyden 
1991). In these contexts, where children’s work is 
related to factors other than low-income levels, a 
LW or LI may not affect the incidence of children’s 
work and might have unintended consequences. 
Thus, policies such as enrolment subsidies, 
improvements in school quality and teacher pay, 
construction of new schools, and conditional 
cash transfers may be more effective at reducing 
children’s work and increasing school enrolment 
than interventions which aim to directly increase 
household income (de Carvalho Filho 2012).
Adoption of a LW may, however, have a negative 
impact on both children’s and adults’ work. There is 
a risk that higher wages for adults would increase 
adult unemployment and also the incentive for 
employers to hire children at lower wage rates 
(Basu 2000). Caution is necessary to ensure that 
LW for adults do not push children into more 
dangerous hidden forms of work, or reduce 
adult employment due to their higher costs, and 
therefore remove an important household income 
source (Aufseeser et al. 2018; Cunningham 2000). 
Consequently, concerted action involving the state, 
smallholders, rural employers, sub-contractors, 
large-scale employers, and produce buyers may be 
necessary to minimise these risks. 
5.1 Bringing together living 
wages, living incomes, and CLFZ 
The discourse around a LW and a LI constructs 
child labour as a result of poverty and low earnings 
(‘poverty argument’) and suggests it as one of 
the strategies that poor households use to top up 
their income. However, this is challenged by the 
‘education argument’, which deems child labour 
not only as an effect of poverty but one of its 
key causes as well, and that the solution to child 
labour is to assure that all children are in full-time 
education. This means that champions of LW and 
LI, and champions of CLFZ see a different dynamic 
between poverty and children’s work. An important 
point is that child labour can be both a cause and 
consequence of poverty and thus the relationship 
is exacerbated in certain contexts. In general, 
poverty and lack of opportunities are a large 
causal factor on child labour, yet once child labour 
is embedded it entrenches poverty further and it 
does so intergenerationally. A unidirectional causal 
argument is simplistic as the dynamic between child 
labour and poverty is bidirectional. 
Another aspect to consider is the difference 
between sector-based or area-based approaches. 
Whilst LW and LI are usually discussed with regard 
to a particular sector or commodity (e.g. smallholder 
cocoa farmers), the CLFZ model uses an integrated 
area-based approach that includes all economic 
activity within, for example, a community. This is an 
important tension, and one that will not be easily 
resolved on the ground.
Despite their differences, proponents of LW, LI, 
and CLFZ also share some common ground. For 
example, they see an indirect correlation between 
children’s work and adults’ earnings. LW and LI 
proponents state that increasing adults’ earnings 
will allow them to support their families without 
the need for their children to work. Furthermore, 
proponents of CLFZ state that a ban on children’s 
work can improve adult working conditions 
and incomes. By definition, CLFZ directly affect 
out-of-school and working children, but they may 
also indirectly impact adults and legally working 
youth. In these areas, adults need to compensate 
for their children’s lost income (SCL 2017a). The 
CLFZ campaign aims to make ‘potential child 
labourers work only in schools’, through ensuring 
fair wages for adult labourers, working with village 
councils on enrolment drives and improving access 
to education (Nagaraj 2017). In this view, when 
child labour is banned in an area, it can create space 
for adults to get additional work and their incomes 
may increase (Anker 2000; Doran 2013; FNV 
2010; Nhenga-Chakarisa 2013; Venkateswarlu and 
Ramakrishna 2010). When adults earn a decent 
income, it can be easier for them to make informed 
and unconstrained decisions about their children’s 
education. Lobbying for decent pay and LW for 
adults is part of the CLFZ advocacy package, 
as they: 
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• Seek partnership with local trade unions5 
and workers’ associations to organise (formal 
and informal) workers in the selected area to 
collectively bargain for higher wages and better 
working conditions.
• Seek collaboration with international trade 
unions and labour rights organisations that can 
help construct arguments based on international 
declarations and human rights instruments. 
(Hivos 2015: 77)
It is important to note that these interventions 
assume a positive return to education and an actual 
5 For example, the General Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU) of Ghana has been working to link CLFZ with decent 
wages. Long before working on CLFZ, GAWU worked with people in the ‘informal economy’ – workers without a contract. 
In Ghana this is the largest group of employees and includes, for example, small-scale cassava and cocoa farmers. The 
union organised these workers so they could get better salaries and social security. While working with the farmers, 
the union encountered many cases of child labour: many farmers were parents of the working children. When GAWU 
started a CLFZ project, it focused on its expertise area: getting better salaries and working conditions for the parents. 
This, combined with awareness-raising on the risks of child labour and the importance of education, intended to motivate 
parents to take their children away from work and send them to school (Hivos 2015).
6 A minimum standard of opportunities provided for children rejects the absolutist view of banning all children’s work and 
the assumption that formal full-time education is always more valuable. It can help identify contextual factors that might 
influence trade‑offs and synergies. This shifts the responsibility from the immediate environment of the child (parent, 
household, workplace, employer) to the state.
trade-off6 between work and education with a 
higher value on education. In this view, banning 
children’s work and simultaneously improving 
the quality of education may reduce the supply of 
unskilled child labour and therefore increase the 
relative wage for adult’s unskilled labour. However, 
in many rural contexts, the return to education can 
be poor: the opportunities for high-skilled workers 
may be few, the likelihood of harm from a work-
related hazard may be low, or the training ‘on the 
job’ may potentially provide a better future income 
and work opportunities than a very low-quality 
education would (Sabates‑Wheeler and Sumberg 
2020). In these situations, is it not immediately 
obvious what is best for the child and/or the family.
17Living Wage, Living Income, and Child Labour-Free Zones: Arguments and Implications for Children’s Work
Annexe A1. Key stakeholders in living 
income and living wage debates
The following provides more detail on the roles of 
some key stakeholders in the living income (LI) and 
living wage (LW) discussions, illustrated with a few 
examples.
1 Farmworkers
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO), the agricultural sector 
employs one billion people worldwide, representing 
one out of every three workers (FAO 2012). Many 
farmworkers do not have formal contracts, nor 
documentation about their wages and working 
conditions, which frequently entail inconsistent 
pay structures, temporary work arrangements, and 
non-cash compensation (FLA 2017). It is even more 
difficult when they are hired by poor smallholders 
that do not earn enough to afford a decent living 
themselves, and therefore cannot pay LW to their 
farmworkers.
2 Smallholder farmers
Productivity-focused approaches have long been 
central to efforts to improve farmers’ livelihoods. 
Smallholder farmers have relatively low market 
and political power, so they find it challenging to 
push alternative approaches or interventions. One 
rationale for tackling productivity is the potential 
opportunity to address the twin challenge of farmer 
welfare and global food security. While productivity 
is a key element in the farm income equation, 
the rationale of a singular approach focused on 
productivity is challenged on two fronts. First, food 
scarcity is not the primary food security challenge, 
since the world is currently producing enough food 
to feed everyone, yet 815 million people go hungry. 
This is in large part due to challenges of poverty, 
distribution, and market inequalities that prevent 
poor people from growing and buying the food 
they need. Second, productivity enhancements 
have not reliably delivered improved farm income. 
There are myriad reasons for this as there are 
many other factors that may affect earnings, 
including increasing production costs and the risk 
of an oversupply and depressing market prices 
(Oxfam 2018). 
At the core of the LI challenge for smallholder 
farmers lies a significant imbalance between the 
risks of agriculture carried by farmers and their 
power to shape their own market participation. 
This imbalance is not accidental, but is reinforced 
by structural barriers at the level of individual value 
chains, commodity sectors, and national public 
policy agendas (Table A1).
Disproportionate risk can represent a key 
disincentive for farm investment. Smallholder 
farmers are limited in their capacity to buffer 
against potential shocks. The risks they face are 
diverse, and include risks related to price, inputs, 
climate, and land (Oxfam 2018). 
Unequal market power is the second key barrier 
that prevents smallholders from enhancing their 
incomes. The proliferation of global value chains 
has come with significant power asymmetries 
between buyers and local farmers. This restricts 
farmers’ ability to reliably access profitable markets, 
effectively bargain with their trading partners, and 
diversify and upgrade their activities (Oxfam 2018).
Underlying the inequality in risks and market power 
are structural barriers that particularly disadvantage 
smallholder farmers. At the level of the value chain, 
inequities in risk and power are manifested in the 
Table A1. Barriers to farmers receiving a living income
Risks Power Structural barriers
Inputs 
Price 
Climate 
Land 
Market access 
Bargaining power 
Upgrading/diversification 
Value chain 
Commodity sector 
Public policy 
Source: Adapted from Oxfam (2018).
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relationships between large and fragmented groups 
of producers and concentrated groups of buyers. At 
the level of the commodity sector, decisions on how 
production and trade are set up and coordinated 
(e.g. in terms of pricing and quality) are made by 
powerful actors (traders, buyers, governments), 
often with little consideration of farmer preferences 
and their income prospects. At the level of public 
policy, the imbalance between risk and market 
power plays out in relation to land rights and access 
to inputs, market infrastructure, export policies, 
taxation, and investment (Oxfam 2018).
Women farmers face gender‑specific income 
barriers, including restricted access to resources 
and services and discriminatory social norms. At the 
same time, however, they are key to raising farmer 
incomes, given their expanding role in agriculture. 
This is especially true for women who are divorced 
or widowed, or who are responsible for their farms 
when other family members are working elsewhere 
(Oxfam 2018).
Cocoa farmers
Despite numerous interventions to support them 
in the last few decades, most smallholder cocoa 
farmers live in poverty and frequently struggle to 
obtain a LI. Even though, at least in Ghana, where 
there is relatively less poverty amongst cocoa 
growers than other areas, cocoa producers currently 
only receive about six per cent of the value of the 
global chocolate industry (Fairtrade 2016). They 
also must face longer-term consequences of an 
increased market price. In 2015, cocoa consumption 
slumped after the market price rose to US$3,000 
per tonne (AfricaNews 2019; AlJazeera 2019; The 
Big Issue 2019; Candy Industry 2018; Globe News 
Wire 2019; Mighty Earth 2019; Nieburg 2018).
3 Cooperatives
Producer organisations are very important in 
advancing the interests of smallholder farmers, 
including their incomes and wages. By uniting 
individual farmers into cooperatives, they are in 
a stronger position to access markets, training, 
and the support needed to improve their earnings 
(Fairtrade 2018). 
REWE Group
The REWE Group is a German diversified retail and 
tourism cooperative, which consists of a network 
of independent retailers. The REWE Group is the 
second largest supermarket chain in Germany 
after EDEKA. Working in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) and Fairtrade, the REWE 
Group is the first food retailer in Germany to launch 
a project in support of a LI for the cocoa sector. 
From autumn 2020, it will be offering a variety of 
Fairtrade chocolate products with fully traceable 
supply chains. These products will also be gradually 
introduced to the group’s international sales lines. 
The cocoa is being supplied by the Fanteakwa 
cooperative in Ghana. In addition to the Fairtrade 
bonuses and minimum prices, cooperative members 
are paid a ‘LI differential’. The aim of this initiative 
is to significantly boost the self‑sufficiency of 
Fanteakwa farmers and enable them to earn a LI 
from farming. Other West African cooperatives are 
also involved in the project. Along with payment 
of a LI differential, the project includes training 
sessions put on by the Initiative for Sustainable 
Agricultural Supply Chains (INA) and its local 
partners. This training focuses on more sustainable 
cultivation practices, ensuring that farms are run 
more efficiently, and improving management of the 
cooperative. It also includes growing other crops, 
such as cashews, in order to diversify sources of 
income (Rückfragen 2019).
4 Trade unions
Trade unions organise campaigns and lobby 
politicians, as well as represent employees in the 
workplace (Parker et al. 2016). Evidence shows 
that collective bargaining raises both the wages 
and benefits of unionised workers compared to 
non-unionised workers doing comparable work. 
Additionally, the ‘union advantage’ or ‘union wage 
premium’ has shown to increase incomes of even 
non-union members, this effect being most striking 
for low-income workers (Schenk 2001).
5 Companies
The role of employers in the LW and LI debate is 
potentially very significant (Parker et al. 2016). As 
subsistence farmers in many agrarian societies 
have shifted to commercial farming, they are more 
dependent on prices paid by local or multinational 
companies for their produce, and on wages received 
for their labour. Many multinational companies are 
indeed committed to fair compensation. They are 
taking the lead on developing socially responsible 
procedures for establishing prices that factor in the 
payment of a LI to farmers and a LW to workers 
throughout their supply chains. In cases where fixed 
market prices present special challenges, alternative 
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means of increasing farmers’ income are sometimes 
explored, such as adding a social premium to the 
price paid (FLA 2017).
Strategies are already being pursued by some 
companies acting individually, collectively, and 
in cooperation with workers, governments, civil 
society, and others, to help raise earnings (FLA 
2017). For most companies, the opportunities to 
support improvements in incomes are primarily 
around the production and trade of the crop of 
interest. However, the rural poor typically depend 
on multiple sources of income, including the food 
and livestock they produce for home consumption. 
Therefore, the levers for achieving improvements 
may go beyond opening market access and 
increasing productivity (Sustainable Food Lab and 
Business Fights Poverty 2017) and include:
• Increasing prices paid to smallholder farmers;
• Simplifying value chains by sourcing directly 
from producers or by committing to purchasing 
their full output;
• Raising workers’ awareness of their rights and 
empowering them to participate in wage-setting 
initiatives;
• Establishing alternative means of delivering 
increased income to farmers to support fair 
wages, such as adding a social premium, or 
providing financial support for farm-level 
productivity improvements;
• Using technology to communicate directly 
with workers, and collecting candid feedback 
on company progress towards meeting fair 
compensation goals; and
• Rewarding responsible suppliers and producers 
that adopt fair compensation practices to 
discourage a ‘race to the bottom’.
Premiums coupled to certification schemes 
generally are not higher than ten per cent of the 
world market price, resulting in a marginal impact 
on farmers’ income. If they are to be part of the 
solution, premiums will have to be more flexible, 
and be a lot higher than current levels. As premiums 
are a supply chain‑based approach, flexible 
premiums can be incorporated into contracts. A 
flexible premium system could help avoid some 
of the problems connected with floor prices. 
Some smaller companies, such as Taza Chocolate, 
Ingemann, and Tony’s Chocolonely, already work 
with flexible premiums based on farm‑gate prices 
(VOICE Network 2017).
7 ‘Natural capital costs’ refer to land and water usage, greenhouse emissions, and fertiliser levels among others (Olam 
Cocoa 2019).
Olam Cocoa
Olam International is a leading global food and 
agribusiness company that supplies food and 
industrial raw materials and operates from seed 
to shelf in 70 countries (Olam Group 2020). In 
2019 Olam Cocoa, the world’s foremost supplier 
of cocoa beans and cocoa ingredients, announced 
Cocoa Compass, a new sustainability initiative for 
responsible sourcing focused on a quality cocoa 
supply chain. Aligned with the SDGs and with 
milestones for action in 2020 and 2024, the Cocoa 
Compass vision for the future of the cocoa sector 
involves improving cocoa farmer livelihoods by 
enabling them to achieve a defined LI level, not 
just lift them out of poverty. Additional objectives 
include eliminating child labour, ensuring all 
children of cocoa farmers have access to education, 
protecting forests through a net increase in tree 
carbon stock, and mitigating environmental impact 
through a 30 per cent reduction in natural capital 
costs7 (Olam Cocoa 2019).
The company has already achieved 100 per cent 
traceability of its supply chains in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana under its 2020 traceability commitment, 
and it has pledged to combat deforestation as part 
of its Cocoa and Forests Initiative. Other highlights 
include paying US$136 million in sustainability 
premiums to farmers and cooperatives in 
partnership with customers and issuing over 
64,000 tailored Farm Development Plans to 
increase productivity and incomes through the Olam 
Farmers Information System. It also established 
Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation Systems 
which cover 95,000 cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire 
and Ghana (Olam Cocoa 2019).
6 Governments
Governments have a broad range of roles in 
creating the conditions necessary for improvements 
in farm income. These include setting the right 
policy framework, from land rights to tax policy. 
Basic services such as health and education are 
central to the enabling environment, alongside the 
creation and maintenance of infrastructure essential 
for market access. Governments have an essential 
role in developing the resilience of agriculture in 
the face of climate change. They also need to play 
a central role in the delivery of effective agricultural 
extension and research services. Generally, 
governments can aim to influence in the following 
spheres (Sustainable Food Lab and Business Fights 
Poverty 2017):
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• Agricultural services by improving know-how, 
inputs (seeds, fertiliser, tools), warehouses, 
drying sheds, and post-harvest machinery;
• Growth of markets, including domestic markets;
• Provision of financial services including credit, 
loans, savings, and insurance;
• Market access involving stable demand, fair 
prices, and favourable terms of trade;
• Gender equality by ensuring women’s 
participation and equal economic empowerment;
• Provision of basic services including water 
(domestic and irrigation), quality education, and 
health; and
• Promoting laws and regulations to strengthen 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, and to 
support decent livelihoods.
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire
Producer country governments have a strong role to 
play; for example, in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, they 
set the price that cocoa farmers receive. Cocoa is 
an important part of national export earnings, and 
there are many competing priorities for investment 
(Fairtrade 2018). A higher farm-gate price for 
cocoa is critical to provide the much-needed 
investment in social and economic development. 
The governments of the world’s biggest cocoa 
producers, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, both guarantee 
a price at the start of each season. They have 
stepped up their efforts to reform the industry, 
imposing a fixed ‘LI differential’ of US$400 a tonne 
on all cocoa contracts for the 2020/21 season. 
7 Consumers
Consumers’ choices also play a big role in farmers’ 
ability to earn a decent living and to achieve a 
sustainable future. Consumers can stand up for 
farmers’ and workers’ livelihoods. Recent studies 
found that workers being paid a LW is a top 
sustainability priority for consumers, and most 
shoppers want companies to take action on global 
poverty (Hawrylyshyn 2019). These preferences 
are usually displayed in their purchasing behaviour 
and choices which ultimately affect employers’ 
revenues, strategies, and future decisions 
(Fairtrade 2019b).
8 NGOs
Civil society and donors have important roles 
in providing expertise on issues such as equity, 
community engagement, farming techniques, and 
resilience. Another vital role is to help bring farmers 
together to reduce transaction costs, increase 
bargaining power, build practical local collaboration 
(such as renting a harvesting machine), and share 
knowledge (Sustainable Food Lab and Business 
Fights Poverty 2017). Many NGOs advocating 
for LI and LW are members of groups, alliances, 
coalitions, foundations, and associations. These 
are working to build and implement a LW and 
LI benchmark and assess actual wage and 
income levels. 
Global Living Wage Coalition
Seven standards systems have made a joint 
commitment and launched an unprecedented 
collaboration in the form of the Global Living 
Wage Coalition. The coalition recognises the need 
for a common definition of LW, independent LW 
benchmarks, a shared approach to measuring LW, 
and more coordination in implementation efforts to 
reduce the gap between actual wages and LW. The 
coalition is made up of ISEAL members Fairtrade 
International, GoodWeave, Rainforest Alliance, and 
UTZ, along with Social Accountability International 
(SAI). Richard Anker and Martha Anker are also 
partnering in this coalition. The long-term goal and 
shared mission of Global Living Wage Coalition 
members is to see improvements in workers’ 
conditions, including wage levels, in the farms, 
factories, and supply chains participating in their 
systems (ISEAL Alliance 2020a).
ISEAL Living Wage Working Group
The ISEAL Living Wage Working Group is an active 
collaboration of six sustainability standards in 
different sectors (FSC, Fairtrade, SAI, UTZ Certified, 
Sustainable Agriculture Network/Rainforest 
Alliance, and GoodWeave International). They 
intend to adopt a common approach to calculating 
LW and to include the concept in their standards 
(ISEAL Alliance et al. 2015).
Living Income Community of Practice
Founded by GIZ, Sustainable Food Lab, and ISEAL, 
the Living Income Community of Practice is an 
alliance of partners dedicated to the vision of 
thriving, economically stable rural communities 
linked to global food and agricultural supply 
chains. The goal of the Living Income Community 
of Practice is to support activities focused on 
enabling smallholder farmers to achieve a decent 
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standard of living by raising their incomes towards 
LI benchmarks. This goes beyond mere poverty 
alleviation, with the intention being for smallholders 
to be able to live relatively comfortable lives (ISEAL 
Alliance 2020b).
The Living Income Community of Practice 
aims to achieve this by fostering learning and 
collaboration between stakeholders through 
hosting webinars, running activities, and producing 
resources. These provide methods and guidance 
on measuring and reporting information on actual 
and LI, understanding the gap between them, and 
identifying strategies to closing those gaps (ISEAL 
Alliance 2020b).
Living Wage Foundation
The Living Wage Foundation is a UK initiative that 
sets LW rates. The rates are calculated according 
to the real cost of living, including food, fuel, and 
childcare for London and the rest of the country 
separately (Fabo and Belli 2017). Established in 
2011, it celebrates and recognises the leadership 
of responsible employers who choose to go further 
than the MW. It offers accreditation to employers 
that pay LW by awarding them the LW Employer 
Mark (ACCA 2017).
Asia Floor Wage 
The Asia Floor Wage, launched in 2009, calculates 
LW in PPP$. Currently, the Asia Floor Wage 
includes the cost of food, housing, clothing, health 
care (including maternity and childcare), education, 
fuel, transport, and savings (Fabo and Belli 2017).
Living Wage by WageIndicator
The WageIndicator Foundation’s mission is to 
provide more labour market transparency for the 
benefit of all employers, employees, and workers 
worldwide by sharing and comparing information 
on wages, labour law, and careers (WageIndicator 
2020). The aim is to analyse income and 
food security in nine countries of East Africa: 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt. Despite 
its regional focus, the calculations are available for 
many other countries worldwide, as the ambition 
is to produce a globally comparable LW indicator 
(Fabo and Belli 2017).
Fair Labour Association
The Fair Labour Association (FLA) is a non‑profit 
collaborative network of universities, civil society 
organisations, and businesses. Its mission is to 
promote adherence to international and national 
labour laws (FLA 2020). Companies that join the 
FLA commit to upholding the FLA Workplace 
Code of Conduct (based on ILO standards) and to 
establishing internal systems for monitoring and 
maintaining workplace conditions throughout their 
supply chains (FLA 2018). 
Every year, the FLA visits hundreds of farms in 
countries around the world to assess working 
conditions against its Workplace Code of Conduct. 
The FLA has been working to strengthen the 
assessment process so it is more effective in 
detecting where wages (even if legal) may still be 
too low. The effort to record compensation data is 
intended to help companies to better understand 
the wages paid to workers on the farms from 
which they source. Over time, these assessments 
have alerted agricultural companies of the need to 
intervene when workers are affected by violations, 
such as non‑payment of MW, or non‑payment of 
social security benefits (FLA 2017).
Fairtrade
Fairtrade is a movement for change that works 
directly with businesses, consumers, and 
campaigners to make trade deliver for farmers 
and workers. The international Fairtrade system 
(of which the Fairtrade Foundation is a part) 
represents the world’s largest and most recognised 
fair trade system. Members of the Fairtrade 
movement advocate for the payment of higher 
prices to producers, as well as improved social 
and environmental standards (Fairtrade 2020b). 
They raise awareness and advocate alongside 
like-minded companies, governments, and civil 
society to make LI for farmers the norm. Fairtrade is 
developing tools to help farmers track their actual 
production costs and revenues, equipping them 
to make informed business decisions and become 
more efficient. Additionally, Fairtrade producer 
networks support cooperatives to improve their 
governance and management capacity, so they are 
strong and reliable business partners, create value 
for their members, and gain access to important 
additional services such as loans (Fairtrade 2019a).
Fairtrade developed the concept of a Living Income 
Reference Price for sustainable pricing, which 
indicates the price needed for full-time farmers with 
adequate, sustainable productivity levels to earn a 
LI. It has been calculated for West African cocoa and 
is being calculated for coffee and vanilla (Fairtrade 
2019a). This target price is based on what the 
ISEAL Living Income Community of Practice has 
calculated would be needed in each country to 
support the average cocoa farming household’s 
basic needs. These include food, housing, clothing, 
health care, and education plus a small provision 
for emergencies. The target price also factors in 
productivity benchmarks and the cost of sustainable 
production. This price model was also validated 
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through a consultation process with producers, 
industry, and civil society. Unlike the Fairtrade 
Minimum Price, the Living Income Reference Price 
is not mandatory. The increase in the Fairtrade 
Minimum Price closes about a quarter of the gap 
between the average Ivorian cocoa farmer’s income 
and the LI, as a first step in a gradual and collective 
process (Fairtrade Canada 2018).
All Fairtrade certified products include the price 
of a Fairtrade Premium: on top of the earnings 
that farmers and workers receive is an extra sum 
of money to invest in improving their life quality. 
Producer organisations often invest their Fairtrade 
Premium into productivity and quality improvement, 
supporting their members to achieve sustainable 
yields. They can also choose to invest in things like 
business development, better service delivery, or 
processing facilities that expand farmers’ share of 
the value chain (Fairtrade 2019a).
Rainforest Alliance
The Rainforest Alliance is an alliance of farmers, 
forest communities, companies, and consumers 
committed to creating a harmonious world for 
people and nature based on responsible business 
(Rainforest Alliance 2020). Sustainable agriculture 
and forestry sectors require farmers, foresters, and 
workers around the world to be paid enough money 
to provide a decent life for themselves and their 
families (Rainforest Alliance 2019). The Rainforest 
Alliance is dedicated to helping producers and 
communities improve their household incomes 
through their certification system, advocacy 
work, and their conservation and development 
investments in priority countries. They attempt to 
build on local knowledge and available research, 
and adaptively manage as new lessons are learned 
(Grillo 2018).
The Sustainable Trade Initiative
IDH, The Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) brings 
governments, companies, civil society organisations, 
and financiers together in action‑driven coalitions. 
The aim of IDH is to coordinate the powers of 
law, entrepreneurship, and investments in order 
to create solutions for global sustainability issues 
at scale (IDH 2020). In the last five years, IDH 
has worked with many partners to improve 
working conditions and close the LW and LI gaps 
in several supply chains. IDH intends to drive 
progress towards decent earnings by convening 
sectoral coalitions, taking action, and continuously 
incorporating lessons learned. It co-designs and 
co-funds projects, develops tools to help partners 
close the gap (e.g. the Salary Matrix and the 
Sustainable Procurement Kit), and researches best 
practices at the producer, trader, buyer, and retailer 
level that contribute to a LW and a LI (ibid.).
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